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The literature on the agricultural transformation in Central an Eastern European countries 
usually neglect the investigation of organisational forms in agriculture. This paper is the first 
to analyse the choice of organisation forms in transition agriculture employing transaction 
cost theory. The analysis is based on Hungarian FADN data in 2003. In general, our results do 
not support the theoretical predictions on the choice of farm organisation, but confirm the 
differences in capital level and farm area observed in different farm organisations. The 
divergence between theory and empirics shed light on the importance of path dependency in 
explaining of farm organisations. 




There is a continuously growing literature on the agricultural transformation in 
Central an Eastern European countries (see survey Brooks and Nash 2002; Rozelle and 
Swinnen 2004). Moreover, extensive literature deals with farm productivity and efficiency in 
these countries (Gorton and Davidova 2004). These studies focus mainly on the factors 
explaining farm efficiency. However, the investigations of organisational forms in agriculture 
were usually neglected in empirical research. The literature on farm organisations 
concentrated exclusively on the issue emerging farm structures in transition countries from 
normative point of view. Namely which type of farm organisation is superior in agriculture in 
terms of efficiency and productivity? But, less research focus on the question: which factors 
explain the organisational choice of farmers? The literature on the choice of farm organisation 
is limited and (Schmitt 1991, 1997, 1997a; Allen and Lueck 1998; Lema et al. 2003). In 
addition, Brem and Kim (2000) and Brem (2002) investigate the restructuring of socialist 
large scale farms but do not deal with family farms. This paper is the first to analyse the 
choice of organisation forms in transition agriculture employing a New Institutional 
Economics framework. More specifically, we have applied the model developed by Allen and 
Lueck (1998) to test the usefulness of the transaction cost theory for transition agriculture. 
The next section presents the theoretical foundation of the empirical model. In section 3, 
outlines empirical methodology and data set. The results of the regression analysis are 
presented in section 4. Section 5 contains a summary and some conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
The literature on transitional economies, especially ‘family farm debate’, usually 
neglects the definitions family farm and does not provide an appropriate typology of farms. It 
should be noted these definitional issues are very important for empirical works and policy 
implications. For example empirical literature on production efficiency tipically use the 
statistical classification of farms, for exapmle considers private farms as family farms, and 
economic organisations identify as corporate farms, which is not unambiguously true. Thus, 
employing statistical categories in various estimations may lead to misleading conclusions. 
Therefore, we briefly review two approaches to farm organisations and some definitions of 
family farms.  
 
2.1 Classification issues 
 
There are two major typologies of farms in the theoretical literature on farm 
organisation. First, considering the stage production, three different farm ownership structures 
can be distinguished: family farms, partnerships, and corporate farms (Allen and Lueck, 
1998). Family farm is considered when a single farmer owns the output and controls all farms assets, including all labour assets. The family farm avoids the problem of moral hazard, but 
this arises at the cost of foregone specialisation gains. Family farms also face higher capital 
costs compared to the other two structures due to a limited possibility of self-financing. 
Factory-style corporate farms are the most complicated agricultural organisations where many 
people own the farm and labour is provided by large groups of specialised fixed wage labour. 
Partnerships are intermediate farm forms, where two or three owners share output and capital 
and all provide labour.  
 
Second approach based on the division of responsibility for labour inputs and the 
managerial implementation of decisions and control the following main organisational forms 
can be classified: lessee-worker, pure share-tenant, and owner-manager (Roumasset, 1995). 
Lessee-worker is considered in case of rent contracts with no hired labour, with very little 
specialisation, and the lessee taking responsibility for both labour and most of managerial 
functions. The pure owner-manager form represents complete specialisation between labour 
and management. Share-tenancy is an intermediate arrangement that motivates the tenant to 
monitor labour shirking and to make and execute the day-to-day production decisions. A 
number of variations of these pure forms are possible, and they can be noticed in practice. 
Taxonomy of agricultural firms according to specialisation in labour, decision making and 
control is follows: owner operator, lessee worker, sharecropper, pure share tenant, share 
manager, lessee manager, owner manager and hired manager. The common feature of these 
two classifications is the optimal handling of moral hazard and of production uncertainty.  
 
There is more attention on defining of family farms in the literature. Gasson and 
Errington (1993) characterised family farms by following elements: business ownership is 
combined with managerial control in the hands of business principals, these principals are 
related by kinship or marriage, family members provide capital to do business, family 
members including business principals do farm work, business ownership and managerial 
control are transferred between the generations with the passage of time, and the family lives 
on the farm. Djurfeldt (1996) argue that Gasson and Errington do not provide a formal 
definition for family farms; consequently it cannot be used for comparative studies over 
historical time or between different societies. Therefore he introduce the term of 'notional 
family farm' that is characterised by an overlapping of three functional units: the unit of 
production (the farm), the unit of consumption (the household), and the unit of kinship (the 
family); stressing that family labour is indispensable for its reproduction according to notional 
family farm. Therefore, if the farm does not require family labour for its reproduction, it 
cannot be considered a notional family farm anymore. The Gasson-Errington framework is 
extended by Reed et al. (2002) including the social and cultural dimensions of farming which 
make family farms both sociably sustainable and culturally viable. 
 
Raup (1986) defines the family farm as an agricultural organisation in which the 
major fraction of control over the most durable inputs, land and labour is exercised or 
contributed by a family unit. He emphasise the importance of control, which means that the 
ownership of durable inputs is not indispensable, e.g. the ownership of the land used in 
production. He argues that the family farm can be identified if total annual labour does not 
exceed 3 men per years. 
 
The main empirical issue in analysis of farm organisation that statistical typology 
does not correspond with the theoretical framework. The data are usually available about 
various agricultural production structures which are important for efficiency investigations, 
but it does not provide information about farm organisation.  
 
Hill (1993, 1996), using Farm Structure Survey of the European Community, divides 
farms into three groups. First, family farm, where is the ratio of Family Work Unit per Annual 
Work Unit (FWU/AWU) greater than 0.95. Second, intermediate farms, where family farms is 
supplemented by hired labour, but still does not exceed 50 per cent (0.5<FWU/AWU<0.95), Finally, Non-family farms, where hired labour contributes the majority of work 




There are two complementing explanations on farm organisations. First approach is 
based on farm household theory (Schmitt 1991, 1997, 1997a and Schmitt et al. 1996). Schmitt 
argue in his subsequent works that the persistence of family farm in developed countries as a 
consequence of limited economies of size relative to the size of family’s labour capacity. The 
farm household being often resticted to family labour is extended to hired labour. Hired 
workers are employed in mainly farms either as a subsitute for or in addition to family 
labours. The reason why family labour is not substituted by hired labours to a much greater 
extent is to be seen not only monitoring and supervision costs. The possible substitution is 
restricted by different requirements of for professional qualification. In short, the advantage of 
family farms results from their flexibility to adjust production capacities, while particularly 
the engagement of non-family labour suffers from severe frictions such as fixed wages and 
employment regulations. The employment of many hired farm workers is burdened high and 
increasing transaction cost; therefore the family farm is superior to corporate farms.  
 
The main critics against Schmitt’s argument are the lack empirical evidence of role of 
transaction cost in explaining the persistence of family farm. He provides some indirect 
evidence in analysing structural changes of farms in Germany between 1979 and 1994. 
Schmitt (1997a) shows that if farm size is measured in terms of farm labour per farm, the 
concentration of farms has been towards farms employing less than one hired labour and less 
than two family labour and hired workers in total.  
 
The empirical evidence on extent and effects of transaction costs are limited and focus 
on developing world. Dong and Dow (1993) investigates the monitoring cost in Chinese 
agricultural teams. They find that the labour supervision absorbed about 10-20 percent of total 
labour time during 1970-1976. Frisvold (1994) investigates the assumption that family and 
hired labour are homogeneous inputs using Indian farm-level data. His results indicate that 
family member supervision is required to increase hired labour productivity. Output loss 
attributable to operating at reduced supervision intensity was greater than 10 per cent on over 
40 per cent of the plots. Evenson et al. (2000) analyse supervision actitivites reported of rice 
farmers in Philippines. They find that transaction costs have a negative effect on farm 
efficiency, but this partially offset by increased supervision intensity which enhances 
efficiency.  
 
The other stream of the research, based on modern theory of firm, takes into account 
the trade-off between moral hazard and gains from specialisation (Allen and Lueck 1998), 
They present a model of farm organisation with one end of a sprectum pure family farms and 
at the other corporate farms. The authors emphasise the role of seasonality and the biological 
nature of agricultural production in explaining of farm organisations. The seasonality and 
biological character of production not only increase the costs of labour monitoring but also 
determine to what extent gains from specialisation are important. While the occurrence of 
sequential production stages limits the gains from specialisation, these become more 
important and labour can be monitored more easily if the effects of nature can be eliminated 
or reduced. As larger farms have better access to capital, removing the effects of nature will 
change the nature of the farm from family-based to corporate. Therefore, the extent to which 
the trade-off between moral hazard incentives on the one hand and gains from specialisation 
and better access to capital on the other favours a certain organisational form depends on the 
influence of biological factors in the production process. Family farms will still dominate in 
sectors where this influence is high, such as in land-intensive crop production. Corporate 
farms will prevail where the influence of nature is reduced through technological innovations, 
such as in capital-intensive livestock production.  Allen and Lueck (1998) using data from Canada and the USA show that seasonality 
and randomness so limit the benefits of specialization that family farms are optimal, but when 
farmers are successful in mitigating the effects of seasonality and random shocks to output, 
farm organizations gravitate toward factory processes and corporate ownership. Lema et al. 
(2003) analyse the factors that explain the predominance of family farms in Argentina 
employing Allen-Lueck model. The results suggest that despite the differences in relative 
prices and public policies moral hazard and limited specialisation are important reasons to 
support the chocie of family farms. 
 
3. Data and empirical methodology 
 
The analysis is based on Hungarian Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) 
private farms database. In Hungarian FADN system data were collected from 1893 farms 
above 2 European Size Units based on representative stratified sampling according to four 
criteria: legal form, farm size, production type and geographic situation. The database 
contains data of 1400 private farms and of 493 economic organisations. After an appropriate 
cleaning of data, the final sample contains 1498 observations in 2003 including 1131 private 
farms and 353 economic organisations. 
 
TABLE 1 Description of Variables 
Variable Name  Definition of Variable 
Dependent variables   
FAMILY FARM
H 1 if family farm; 0 not 
FAMILY FARM
R 1 if family farm; 0 not 
FARMTYPE  1 if family farm; 2 if intermediate farm; 3 if corporate farm 
LAND  Total land on the farm in hectares 




CYCLE>1  1 if farm produce crops that have more than one cycle; 0 if 
not 
CYCLE<1  1 if farm produce crops that have fewer than one cycle; 0 if 
not 
ANIMALS1  1 if farm produce milk, pork and poultry; 0 if not 
ANIMALS2  1 if farm produce beef and lamb; 0 if not 
RENTED LAND  share of rented land in total land 
AGE  Age of farmers in years 
Note: h and r superscripts describe farm classification based on Hill and Raup. 
 
Table 1 show the description of variables. The FADN farm classification (private 
farm and economic organisation) does not provide appropriate information about organisation 
forms in terms of our interest. Therefore we classify the farms using both Hill (1993) and 
Raup (1986) typology. Following Raup classification we have 586 family farms and 898 non-
family farms, corresponding numbers for Hill’s grouping are 651 and 883. These numbers 
shed light on the difference between FADN and other conceptual classifications.  
 
Following Allen and Lueck (1998), we divide the crops into two categories: crops 
that always have at least one cycle per year and crops that may have less than one cycle per 
year. Taking into account characteristics of our sample livestock production are separated into 
two groups: Animals1 contains milk, pig and poultry farms, while Animal2 consists beef and 
lamb farms. The estimated equations also include the rented land the age of farmer as control 
variables.  
In order to investigate the factors affecting the choice of farm organisations the logit 
is employed. For the choice of farm organisations, the dependent variable is specified, 
whether the farm is a family or non-family farm. The multinomial logit model is applied for 
the choice of farm organisations, where three outcomes: family farm, intermediate farms, and 
corporate farms. We used the family farm as a reference category.  
 
4. Empirical results 
 
The analysis comes in two parts. First, we estimate the determinants of farm 
organisation between family and non-family organisations. Second, we estimate the effect of 
the choice of farm organisation on the size of farm in terms of the value of capital and area 
controlled by the farm. We also test the sensitivity of our results on different classifications of 
farm. 
 
4.1 The choice of farm organisation 
 
We focus on three predictions by Allen and Lueck (1998) model. First, as the number 
of production cycles increases the family farming will be less common. Second, as the 
importance of specialisation increases the family farm becomes are less likely. Finally, as the 
monitoring costs on labour increase the family farm becomes are more likely. The sample size 
is slightly smaller than the original sample because of missing data for RENTED LAND 
variable. 
 
TABLE 2 Logit Model for Farm Organisation 
 FAMILY  FARM
H FAMILY FARM
R
CYCLE>1 0.400 0.939 
 (0.251)  (0.006) 
CYCLE<1 -1.602  -0.676 
 (0.000)  (0.107) 
ANIMALS1 -0.579  -0.005 
 (0.047)  (0.985) 
ANIMALS2 -0.591  0.568 
 (0.385)  (0.347) 
AGE -0.009  -0.001 
 (0.118)  (0.822) 
RENTED LAND  -1.677  -0.988 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant 0.855  -0.663 
 (0.083)  (0.168) 
N 1394  1394 
McFadden's R
2: 0.112    0.061 
Log-Likehood -852.638 -880.192 
Correctly classified (%)  65.71  63.13 
Note: H and R superscripts describe the farm classification based on Hill (1993) and 
Raup(1986); p values are in parentheses 
 
The logit model for the choice of organisation forms shows that cycles variables have 
the opposite signs for both specifications. The variable CYCLE>1 is statistically significant 
for Hill model, while variable CYCLE<1 is significant for Raup model. The estimated 
coefficient of ANIMALS1 variable has expected sign for both model and it is significant for 
the Hill model. The ANIMALS2 variable has expected sign for Raup model, but it is not significant. The estimated coefficients of control variables have expected sign and RENTED 
LAND are statistically significant. The estimates show that the older farmers are more likely 
to organise their operations as non-family farms, moreover the family farms use less rented 
land. 
 
Brem and Kim (2000) emphasises that farm structures in transition countries are more 
complex than presented by Allen and Lueck (1998). Therefore, the next set of regression 
results we also consider intermediate farms as a third option for the organisational choice of 
farmers. The marginal effects of multinomial logit model of factors affecting farmers’ choices 
are presented in Table 3.  
 
TABLE 3 Marginal effects of Multinomial Logit Model for Farm Organisation 
  FAMILY FARM  INTERMEDIATE FARM  CORPORATE FARM 
CYCLE>1 0.140  0.075  -0.215 
 (0.142)  (0.034)  (0.016) 
CYCLE<1 -0.278  0.181  0.096 
 (0.000)  (0.028)  (0.324) 
ANIMALS1 -0.059  0.056  0.003 
 (0.161)  (0.073)  (0.962) 
ANIMALS2 -0.081  0.106  -0.025 
 (0.540)  (0.315)  (0.850) 
AGE -0.002  0.001  0.002 
 (0.355)  (0.896)  (0.182) 
RENTED LAND  -0.258  -0.041  0.408 
 (0.000)  (0.098)  (0.000) 
Note: p values are in parentheses 
 
The results show similar results to logit model, the variables CYCLE and 
ANIMALS1 have opposite sign for family farm and corporate farm. The ANIMALS2 have 
predicted signs but it is insignificant for all outcomes. The CYCLE and ANIMALS variables 
have positive signs for intermediate farms, and the estimates are statistically significant. The 
estimated coefficients on the control variables imply that the younger farmers are more likely 
to organise their operations as family farms, while older farmers prefer intermediate and 
corporate farms. In addition, family and intermediate farms use less rented land. 
 
The multinomial logit model has an important restriction known as the independence 
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which is formally described: 
( 1 )            [] ) exp
) (
) (
b n b m β β (x
x n y Pr





where the odds do not depend on other outcomes that are available (Scott and Long 
2003: 207).  
 
Table 4  Tests of IIA Assumption 
Hausman test   
  χ
2 P value 
1  -9.778 1.000 
2  -0.060 1.000 
3  -0.416 1.000 
Small-Hsiao tests   
  χ
2 P value 
2 2.899  0.894 
3 7.082  0.420 
 Stata provides two tests of the IIA assumption. First test is developed by Hausman 
and McFadden (1984) that was improved by Small and Hsiao (1985). To check whether the 
IIA assumption is strong enough, both Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests were run for the choice 
of farm organisation. Results show that the IIA assumptions are met for our model (Table 4.). 
 
4.2 The size of farm 
 
The theory predict that the level of capital will be lowest for family farmers who face 
the highest cost of capital and largest for corporate farms that face the lowest cost of capital. 
First, we used total capital assets as a measure of a farm’s capital intensity. We employ three 
different classifications of farms to test the sensitivity our results. The OLS estimates include 
the same set of exogenous variables as used in the farm organisation models. The results show 
that coefficients have predicted signs and they are significant for all specifications, that is 
family farm use less capital than non-family farms. The estimates suggest that older farmers 
tend to have more capital stocks. 
 
TABLE 5 The OLS Estimation of Farm Capital 
Variable CAPITAL 
FAMILY FARM
H -48531.54    
 (0.000)     
FAMILY FARM
R  -52270.06   
   (0.000)   
FARMTYPE     34118.81 
     (0.000) 
CYCLE>1 -76058.38  -69404.56  -70066.65 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
CYCLE<1 -58643.15  -49304.84  -57126.76 
 (0.010)  (0.029)  (0.011) 
ANIMALS1 -7588.67  -1401.30  -6107.432 
 (0.336)  (0.852)  (0.419) 
ANIMALS2 -84530.61  -71989.24  -81771.82 
 0.000  0.000  0.000 
AGE 446.22  525.93  405.10 
 (0.100)  (0.052)  (0.131) 
RENTED LAND  63869.92  70148.36  53006.74 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant 101761.73  86676.62  15654.71 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.511) 
n 1394  1394  1394 
R
2 0.1760 0.1641 0.1569 
F(7,1386) 25.42  32.45  27.90 
Note: H and R superscripts describe the farm classification based on Hill (1993) and 
Raup(1986); p values are in parentheses 
 
We used farm are as an alternative proxy for farm’s capital intensity, and we estimate 
the previous model by substituting land are for capital. Because farm area includes rented 
land, the variable RENTLAND is omitted from the FARM LAND equation. The OLS 
regression results confirm prediction, i.e. family farm use less area of land than non-family 




 TABLE 6 The OLS Estimation of Farm Land 
Variable FARM  LAND 
FAMILY FARM
H -310.25    
 (0.000)     
FAMILY FARM
R  -270.78   
   (0.000)   
FARMTYPE     208.64 
     (0.000) 
CYCLE>1 -87.46  -99.19  -6.04 
 (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.850) 
CYCLE<1 -413.64  -397.62  -343.08 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ANIMALS1 -264.45  -239.89  -226.35 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ANIMALS2 -287.12  -248.36  -224.04 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
AGE 2.95  3.24  2.92 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant 362.28  320.31  -256.47 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
n 1484  1484  1484 
R
2 0.1951 0.1194  0.1569 
F(6,1477) 35.87  34.64  33.99 
Note: H and R superscripts describe the farm classification based on Hill (1993) and Raup 




In this paper we investigated the choice on farm organisation in Hungary employing 
transaction costs economics framework. In general, our empirical study rejects the theoretical 
predictions of Allen-Lueck model impacts on farm organization in Hungary due to crop cycles 
and monitoring costs. But, the theoretical model correctly predicts the differences in capital 
levels and farm acreage observed in different farm organizations. Sensitivity analyses were 
carried out to examine how robust our results are to reasonable alternative specifications 
regarding to the definitions of farm types. Theoretical and empirical literature do not provide a 
guide to the appropriateness of the specifications, so we employ a number of heuristic 
estimation. In sum, it appears that our results are robust to these alternative specifications.  
 
Previous studies on Hungarian agriculture focusing on productivity provide some 
contradictiory results. First studies have been based on data sets for the mid-1990s. Hughes 
(2000) present evidence that small farms in Hungary (within his sample less than 30 ha) seemed 
more efficient. Mathijs and Vranken (2001) investigate farm-specific technical efficiency in 
Hungarian crop and dairy farms, and confirm the superiority of farmily farms over corporate 
farms in crop farming, but rejected it in dairy farming. Gorton et al. (2003) find that the 
majority of commercially oriented farms are profitable. However, these results should be 
compared with care because of using different classification of farms.  
 
Our results shed light on the weakness of theory of farm organisations. Transaction 
costs economics framework does not take into account the conseqences of path dependency 
which is an important element in explaining of the evolution of farm structures. For example, 
the starting position of different types of farms has significant influence on survival of farms. Rizov and Mathijs (2003) show that older and larger farmss are more likely survive, farm 
growth decrease with farm age when farm size held constant and that learning considerations 
are important. Farm organisations forms are more complex as the model of agricultural firms 
is assumed. In addition, the role of agricultural policy, the links of farmers to input markets 
also should be considered. Therefore, further research is necessary to better understand 
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